Appeal Reference number:
UPC_ CoA_563/2024
APL_53716/2024

ORDER
of the Court of Appeal of the Unified Patent Court
issued on 11 February 2025
R 220.2 RoP Appeal of a Panel Review (R 333 RoP) Order

HEADNOTES:
• No corporate representative of a legal person or any other natural person who has extensive
administrative and financial powers within the legal person, whether as a result of holding a
high-level management or administrative position or holding a significant amount of shares in
the legal person, may serve as a representative of that legal person, regardless of whether said
corporate representative of the legal person or natural person is qualified to act as a UPC
representative in accordance with Art. 48(1) or (2) UPCA.
• One of the objectives of parties being represented by a lawyer is, among other things, to ensure
that legal persons are defended by a representative who is sufficiently distant from the legal
person which he or she represents.
• The independent exercise of the duties of a representative is not undermined by the mere fact
that the lawyer or the European patent attorney, qualified as a representative under Art. 48(1)
or (2) UPCA, is employed by the party he or she represents.
• A representative who is employed by a party must act towards the Court as an independent
counsellor by serving the interests of his or her client in an unbiased manner without regard to
his or her personal feelings or interests, pursuant to Art. 2.4.1 of the Code of Conduct for
Representatives who appear before the Court according to R. 290.2 RoP.

KEYWORDS:
Representation of parties in proceedings before the UPC, Art. 48 UPCA.

APPELLANT (DEFENDANT IN THE R 333 ROP APPLICATION AND CLAIMANT IN THE MAIN

INFRINGEMENT ACTION BEFORE
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE)
Suinno Mobile & AI Technologies Licensing Oy, Helsinki, Finland (hereafter “Suinno”)
represented by European Patent Attorney,

RESPONDENT (APPLICANT IN THE R 333 ROP APPLICATION AND DEFENDANT IN THE MAIN INFRINGEMENT ACTION
BEFORE THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE)
Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington, USA (hereafter “Microsoft”)
represented by Prof. Dr. Tilmann Müller-Stoy and Nadine Westermeyer, attorneys-at-law,
Bardehle Pagenberg, Partnerschaft mbB Patentanwälte Rechtsanwälte.

PATENT AT ISSUE
EP 2 671 173

DECIDING PANEL
Panel 1a
Klaus Grabinski, President of the Court of Appeal,
Peter Blok, legally qualified judge,
Emmanuel Gougé, legally qualified judge and judge-rapporteur.

LANGUAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
English

IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
□ Order of the Court of First Instance of the Unified Patent Court, Central Division, Paris Seat,
dated 16 September 2024
□ Numbers attributed by the Court of First Instance:
UPC_CFI_164/2024
App_40799/2024
ACT_18406/2024
ORD_41174/2024

DATE OF THE ORAL HEARING:
29 January 2025


FACTS AND REQUESTS OF THE PARTIES
1. Suinno is a Finnish company which owns and licences patents.
The patent at issue
2. Suinno is the proprietor of European Patent 2 671 173 (the patent at issue) which pertains to a
method and means for browsing by walking. The patent at issue was filed on 29 December 2011
claiming priority from a U.S. application filed on 04 February 2011 and the grant of the patent at
issue was published on 24 October 2018. The registered inventor is The
registered proprietor at the date of grant was Suinno Oy, a Patent attorney firm whose managing
partner is also
The first instance proceedings
3. On 09 April 2024, Suinno filed a claim against Microsoft with the Paris Central Division for
infringement of the patent at issue (ACT_18406/2024 UPC_CFI_164/2024).
4. Together with its Statement of Claim, Suinno filed an application under Art. 53 of the Agreement on
a Unified Patent Court (hereafter “UPCA”), R. 262 of the Rules or Procedure of the Unified Patent
Court (hereafter “RoP”) and Art. 262A UPCA, requesting that certain documents be kept confidential
from both the public and Microsoft (App_19084/2024, UPC_CFI_164/2024).
5. The judge-rapporteur found that the application was admissible. He rejected as unfounded the
objection raised by Microsoft based on the alleged lack of independence of
Suinno’s representative. He ordered that access to documents be restricted to Microsoft attorneys
and Microsoft directors who have a legitimate need to access these documents for the purposes of
the proceedings (CFI, Paris CD, Order ORD_27206/2024 of 26 June 2024).
6. On 11 July 2024, Microsoft filed an R. 333 RoP application for a panel review of the order issued by
the judge-rapporteur (App_40799/2024 UPC_CFI_164/2024). Following this, the Court of First
Instance set aside the order, declared inadmissible the R. 262A RoP application filed by Suinno, and
ordered the documents to be disclosed under confidentiality to certain identified persons only, and
granted leave to appeal (impugned order, ORD_41174/2024 of 16 September 2024).
7. The reasoning of the Court of First Instance on admissibility can be summarized as follows, insofar
as relevant:
• Art. 48(5) UPCA is modelled on the nearly identical provision of Art. 19(5) of the Statute of the
CJEU, which has been consistently interpreted as requiring that a party seeking to bring an
action before an EU Court must engage the services of a third person authorised to practise
before a court of a Member State or of a State that is a party to the Agreement on the European
Economic Area and therefore is not permitted to act on its own behalf;
• said interpretation is based on the conception of the lawyer’s role within the legal order of the
European Union, which is to collaborate in the administration of justice and to provide legal
assistance to the client in full independence and in the overriding interests of that cause;
• the requirement of the independence of a lawyer implies that a party cannot be properly
represented before the CJEU by a lawyer who is employed by or financially dependent on the
client, or by one who holds, within the represented body, extensive administrative and financial
powers, as established by the case law of the CJEU;
• although said interpretation is not binding upon national judges and applies to proceedings
before the CJEU, the substantially identical wording of this provision and the wording of
Art. 49(5) UPCA suggests that the intent of the UPC Member States was to incorporate the Court
of Justice's interpretation of Art. 19(5) of its Statute regarding the requirement of a
representative’s independence;
• from this, it follows that Suinno’s representative, who is also Suinno’s
managing director and main shareholder, enjoys extensive administrative and financial powers
within the body he represents and that he can therefore not be considered independent for the
purpose of a valid representation of his client in proceedings before the UPC;
• the concept of the legal independence of a representative must be interpreted in an “absolute
sense”, in line with the case law of the Court of Justice and does not require an assessment of
the potential harm to the party represented;
• as a consequence of the foregoing, the R. 262A RoP application filed on 9 April 2024 must be
declared inadmissible, and the order issued by the judge-rapporteur on 26 June 2024, which
granted the application, must be set aside. The inadmissibility of the respondent's application
does however not affect the confidential nature of the information, as it arises from a
procedural issue.
The appeal
Suinno lodged an appeal against the impugned order, requesting the Court of Appeal to:
• set aside the order concerning the inadmissibility of the R. 262A RoP application and the lack of
independence of Suinno’s representative (paragraphs 28 to 41 of the impugned order) and
uphold the remainder of the order;
• in the alternative, “move” the filing date of the main infringement action to 17 September 2024;
• in the subsequent alternative, grant a full or partial reimbursement of the paid Court fees;
• in the final alternative, refer the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. This last request
was however withdrawn by Suinno during the hearing.
8. The grounds of the appeal can be summarized as follows, insofar as relevant:
• the CFI incorrectly interprets the word “independently” in the context of Art. 48(5) UPCA and
contradicts the initial intent of the UPC Members States insofar as it requires the representative
to be a ”third person” in addition to being independent, despite no such requirement being
provided for under the UPCA;
• when considering the independence of the representatives under Art. 48(5) UPCA, a distinction
should be drawn between in-house attorneys, on the one hand, who are employed by the entity
they are representing and on which they depend, and, on the other hand, representatives who
are directors and shareholders of the company they represent, who may control the company
but are not dependent upon the company they represent;
• an excessively strict interpretation of independence, combined with the “third party”
requirement, could lead to a situation where the mere ownership by the representative of one
or more shares in the company he or she represents, could call into question their
independence;
• by reference to the principle of equality of arms, parties should be allowed to organize their
representation “in the best possible way available”.
9. Microsoft responded to the appeal, requesting that the Court of Appeal reject the appeal and order
Suinno to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings and, in the alternative, refer questions to the
CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
10. Microsoft’s arguments can be summarised as follows, insofar as relevant:
• Suinno’s representative does not meet the requirement of independence set out under
Art. 48(5) UPCA or under Art. 2.4 of the Code of Conduct for Representatives who appear before
the UPC according to R. 290.2 RoP and adopted by the Administrative Committee on 8 February
2023;
• a representative must not be “connected” to the represented party in a manner that creates
bias or influences their behaviour as a result of this connection;
• According to the CJEU standard, a party cannot be properly represented by an individual who
is financially dependent on the principal or who has extensive administrative and financial
powers within the represented party;
• under Union law (Art. 19 Statute of the CJEU), a party and its representative cannot be the same
person. This requirement is justified by CJEU case law, which emphasises that the
representative must collaborate in the administration of justice and provide such legal
assistance as the client needs in full independence and in the overriding interests of justice. It
is further justified by legal professional privilege, which requires that the exchange of
documents and information occurs with and between independent representatives;
• the language under Art. 48(5) UPCA is substantially identical to that of Art. 19(5) of the Statute
of the CJEU, on which the case law of the CJEU is based, which implies that the Contracting
Member States of the UPCA intended to transpose the CJEU’s interpretation of Art. 19 (5) of its
Statute on the requirement of independence of representatives to Art. 48(5) UPCA;
• the lack of independence of Suinno’s representative is manifest: he is, or at least was at the
time of filing the infringement action and the R 262A application, the named inventor of the
patent in dispute, the original applicant of the patent application underlying the patent in
dispute, the managing director of the first assignee of the patent at issue (Suinno Oy), Suinno’s
managing director and Board Member, the main shareholder of the company, controlling 100%
and owning 93.3% of Suinno’s equity interest.
11. In a procedural order issued on 21 October 2024, the Court gave the parties a final opportunity to
submit new evidence, following which both Microsoft and Suinno responded, on 22 and 23 October
2024 respectively, that they would not be submitting additional evidence, subject to any further
submissions from the opposing party. Suinno, nevertheless, proceeded to file additional evidence
on 29 November 2024.
12. Following the hearing, Suinno filed a R. 9.3 RoP application on 31 January 2025, raising additional
remarks regarding the attorney-client relationship, which had not been discussed during the hearing
and to which Microsoft has not responded.

GROUNDS FOR THE ORDER
13. The appeal must be rejected for the following reasons.
14. Suinno has not been validly represented by a representative within the meaning of Art. 48 (1) (2)
and (5) UPCA.
Representation
15. It follows from Art. 48(1) and (2), in conjunction with Art. 48(7) UPCA, that parties must be
represented before the UPC in all actions under Art. 32(1) UPCA, with the exception of actions under
Art. 32(1)(i) UPCA.
16. This is confirmed under R. 8.1 RoP, which states that a party must be represented in accordance
with Article 48 UPCA, unless otherwise provided by the Rules of Procedure (Rules 5, 88.4 and 378.5).
17. Representation may be provided by lawyers authorized to practice before a court of a Contracting
Member State (Art. 48(1) UPCA) or, alternatively, by European Patent Attorneys who are entitled to
act as professional representatives before the European Patent Office pursuant to Art. 134
European Patent Convention (EPC) and who have appropriate qualifications, such as a European
Patent Litigation Certificate (Art. 48(2) UPCA).
18. This understanding of Art. 48(1) and (2) UPCA is complemented by Art. 48(5) UPCA, which sets forth
that representatives of the parties shall enjoy the rights and immunities necessary for the
independent exercise of their duties, including the privilege from disclosure in proceedings before
the Court in respect of communications between a representative and the party, or any other
person, under the conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure, unless such privilege is expressly
waived by the party concerned. These rights and immunities only apply to representatives, not to
parties.
19. In accordance with Art. 48(5) and (6) UPCA, the rights and obligations of representatives are further
specified in Part 5 (general provisions), Chapter 3 (rights and obligations of representatives) of the
RoP.
20. If the party is a natural person, the representation requirement under Art. 48(1) and (2) UPCA
implies that this person is not entitled to represent him or herself, regardless of whether the person
is qualified to act as a UPC representative in accordance with Art. 48(1) or (2) UPCA. This
understanding is based on the term “representation” used in Art. 48(1) and (2) UPCA and the
concept of rights and immunities of representatives outlined in Art. 48(5) and (6) UPCA and R. 287
to 292 RoP.
21. If the party is a legal person, the same principle applies. As neither Art. 48 UPCA nor Part 5, Chapter
3 of the UPC Rules of Procedure distinguish between natural or legal persons regarding
representation before the UPC, the UPC representative of a party that is a legal person must be as
distant from the party as it would be if the party were a natural person.
22. It follows that no corporate representative of a legal person, or any other natural person who has
extensive administrative and financial powers within the legal person, - whether as a result of
holding a high-level management or administrative position or holding a significant amount of
shares in the legal person - may serve as a representative of that legal person, regardless of whether
said corporate representative of the legal person or natural person is qualified to act as a UPC
representative in accordance with Art. 48(1) or (2) UPCA.
23. This interpretation of the term “represented” under Art. 48(1) and (2) UPCA and “representatives”
in Art. 48(5) and (6) UPCA aligns with the interpretation of Art. 19(3) of the Statute of the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU Statute) by the CJEU.
24. According to established case law of the CJEU, Art. 19(3) and (4) CJEU Statute contains two distinct
yet cumulative conditions regarding representation in proceedings before the CJEU.
25. The first condition, set out in the third paragraph of Art. 19 CJEU Statute, requires that a party be
represented by a lawyer. The second condition, contained in the fourth paragraph of that article,
provides that the lawyer representing that party must be authorised to practice before a court of a
Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement (CJEU, 4 February 2020,
C-515/17 P and 561/17 P, para 55 f. – Uniwersytet Wroclawski and Poland/REA).
26. The second condition mirrors the requirement under Art. 48(1) and (2) UPCA that a lawyer
representing a party must be authorised to practice before a court of a UPC Contracting Member
State and that a patent attorney representing a party must be a European Patent Attorney with the
appropriate qualifications.
27. As regards the first condition relating to the concept of “lawyer”, however, the CJEU has adopted
an autonomous and uniform interpretation of Art. 19(3) CJEU Statute. It follows from the wording,
and in particular from the use of the term “represented”, that a “party” as referred to in that
provision, irrespective of that party’s standing, is not authorized to act on its own behalf before a
Court of the European Union (see CJEU, 4 February 2020, C-515/17 P and 561/17 P, para 57 f., cited
above) and that a legal person cannot be properly represented before the Courts of the EU by a
lawyer who has, within the body which he represents, extensive administrative and financial
powers, holds a high-level management position within or holds shares in the legal person, or is the
president of the board of administration of the company (above cited CJEU, 4 February 2020, C-
515/17 P and 561/17 P, para 65; 5 September 2013, C-573/11 P, para 12 – ClientEarth/EU Council,
also cited in the impugned Order, para 36).
28. One of the objectives of parties being represented by a lawyer is, among other things, to ensure
that legal persons are defended by a representative who is sufficiently distant from the legal person
which he or she represents (CJEU, 4 February 2020, C-515/17 P and 561/17 P, para 61; CJEU, 5
September 2013, C-573/11 P, para 14).
29. That interpretation of the term “represented” in Art. 19(3) CJEU Statute aligns with the
understanding of the term “represented” in Art. 48(1) and (2) UPCA, as outlined above.
30. Suinno’s argument that this interpretation “destroys access to justice” and violates the principle of
equality of arms must be rejected. To the extent that the requirement to have recourse to a third
party constitutes a relevant restriction of access to justice and the equality of arms as guaranteed
by the fundamental right to a fair trial, such restriction is justified by an objective of general interest.
The requirement serves the interests of justice, as it is essential to the representative’s role in
collaborating in the administration of justice and providing such legal assistance as his client needs
in the overriding interests of justice (cf. CJEU 5 September 2013, C-573/11 P, para 12 –
ClientEarth/EU Council).
Independence
31. As already mentioned, Art. 48(5) UPCA provides that the representatives of the parties shall enjoy
the rights and immunities necessary for the independent exercise of their duties, including the
privilege from disclosure in proceedings before the Court in respect of communications between a
representative and the party or any other person, under the conditions laid down in the Rules of
Procedure.
32. The independent exercise of the duties of a representative is not undermined by the mere fact that
the lawyer or the European patent attorney, qualified as a representative under Art. 48(1) or (2)
UPCA, is employed by the party he or she represents.
33. This interpretation is in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to which Art. 48(5) UPCA explicitly
refers, among which R. 287.2 RoP explicitly provides that the attorney-client privilege laid down in
R. 287.1 RoP applies also to communications between a client and a lawyer or a patent attorney
employed by the client and instructed to act in a professional capacity, whether in connection with
proceedings before the Court or otherwise, and R. 288.1 RoP which concerns litigation privilege and
refers equally to R. 287.1 and 2 RoP regarding the addressees of that privilege.
34. This understanding of the term “independent exercise of duties” in Art. 48(5) UPCA is in line with
the Code of Conduct for Representatives who appear before the Court according to R. 290.2 RoP of
8 February 2023 (Code of Conduct or CoC).
35. The Code of Conduct is based on R. 290.2 RoP and explicitly provides under its Art. 1 (Field of
Application) that, in the event of a conflict between the Code of Conduct and the Rules of Procedure,
the latter shall prevail. It follows that the Code of Conduct is to be applied to lawyers and patent
attorneys that qualify as party representatives under Art. 48(1) or (2) UPCA, regardless of whether
they are employed by the party or not.
36. This means that a representative who is employed by a party must also act towards the Court as an
independent counsellor by serving the interests of his or her clients in an unbiased manner without
regard to his or her personal feelings or interests, pursuant to Art. 2.4.1 CoC.
37. The Code of Conduct also imposes a strict obligation on the representative, irrespective of whether
he or she is employed by the party, to refrain from using any information not related to the case
when carrying out measures ordered by the Court to preserve or gather evidence (including
inspection of premises) for any purpose or disclose the same to any person, including his or her
client, irrespective of whether he or she is employed by the client (CoC, Art 2.6).
38. It further follows from R. 291 RoP that the conduct of a representative employed by a party must
be compatible with the requirements of the proper administration of justice, even in cases where it
may conflict with the interest of the party he or she represents.
39. In case the representative sees a risk that he or she cannot fulfil his or her overriding obligations
under the UPCA, the Rules of Procedure or the Code of Conduct, he or she must recuse himself or
herself from the respective proceedings. Similarly, if the court considers that a representative does
not act in conformity with said overriding obligations, he or she may be excluded at any time by the
Court from the proceedings by way of order pursuant to R. 291.1 RoP. The UPCA, the Rules of
Procedure and the Code of Conduct therefore safeguard the representative’s independent exercise
of duties not by excluding employed lawyers and patent attorneys as such, but by excluding any
representative who fails to act independently, whether employed or not.
40. This Court is aware that its interpretation of the term “independent exercise of duties” in Art. 48(5)
UPCA differs from the interpretation of the same term in Art. 19(5) CJEU Statute, as it is settled case
law of the CJEU that a lawyer who is employed by a legal entity is not entitled to represent the legal
entity as a party in proceedings before the CJEU and the EU Courts (CJEU, 14 September 2010, C-
550/076, para 43 f.; April 2017, C-464/16 P, para 29 – PITEEE/EU Commission; 4 February 2020, C-
515/17 P and C-561/17 P, para 63).
41. In this context, it should be noted that the concept of independence developed by the CJEU results
from an autonomous interpretation of Art. 19 CJEU Statute by the CJEU and applies specifically to
proceedings before the EU Courts.
42. It does not apply to representatives in proceedings before the national courts of the Member States,
as it does not apply to the recognised possibility for a person authorised, under national law, to
represent a party in a dispute to continue representing that same party before the CJEU in the
context of a reference for a preliminary view (CJEU, 4 February 2020, C-515/17 P and 561/17 P, para
57).
43. In fact, as reported by the CJEU in its judgement in the “Akzo Nobel and Akcros/EU Commission”
case, the General Court held in 2007 that, although it is true that specific recognition of the role of
in-house lawyers and the protection of communications with such lawyers under legal professional
privilege was relatively more common in 2004 than in 1982 (when the judgement in the case “AM
& S Europe v Commission was handed down), it was nevertheless not possible to identify tendencies
which were uniform or had clear majority support in the laws of the Member States (CJEU, 14
September 2010, C-550/07 P, para 69 ff.). As underlined by the CJEU, there are thus different
approaches across EU and UPC Member States regarding in-house representatives, further justifying
that the UPC may not follow the interpretation adopted by the CJEU in this regard.
44. As the UPC is a court common to the participating Member States and subject to the same
obligations under Union law as any national court of the Contracting Member States pursuant to
Art. 1(2) UPCA and is thus not an EU court, it follows that the UPC - like the national courts of its
Contracting Member States - is not bound by the CJEU’s interpretation of the term “independent
exercise of duties” in Art. 19(5) CJEU Statute that lawyers employed by a legal entity are not entitled
to represent that entity as a party in proceedings before the CJEU and the EU Courts. Instead, the
UPC must provide an autonomous interpretation of the term “independent exercise of duties”
under Art. 48(5) UPCA in the context of the UPCA, the Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct,
as has been done above in this order.
Suinno’s representative
45. The Court of First Instance found that it is “undebated” that Suinno’s representative,
is Suinno’s managing director and main shareholder, which gives him extensive
administrative and financial powers within Suinno.
46. Suinno merely asserts that held an independent director seat and was the main
shareholder of the company when it was founded. Suinno does however not show that the findings
of the CFI as to the position of as Suinno’s managing director and main shareholder
are incorrect.
47. Although is qualified as a European patent attorney and entitled, in general, to
represent a party in UPC proceedings pursuant to Art. 48(2) UPCA, his extensive administrative and
financial powers within Suinno - due to his position as managing director and main shareholder -
preclude him from representing Suinno in filing an application under R. 262A RoP, requesting certain
documents to be kept confidential from Microsoft.
48. In an additional statement of 29 November 2024, Suinno brought forward that it does not deny its
representative past role within the company, that changes in the Register have been only partially
processed and that its representative is still listed as an independent director. It is also alleged that
Suinno’s representative does not own any shares directly but only indirectly, which in Suinno’s view
is irrelevant as it does not demonstrate that the representative depends on the client.
49. This statement cannot be considered. Pursuant to R. 222.1 and 2 RoP, only facts and arguments the
appellant submitted in the Statement of appeal constitute the subject-matter of the proceedings
before the Court of Appeal and Suinno has not given any reasons why the new facts and arguments
should not be disregarded. Additionally, Suinno did not file a reasoned request for a reply to the
Respondent’s Statement of response, as required by R. 36 RoP. Furthermore, it was only filed after
the judge-rapporteur informed the parties by procedural order of 21 October 2024 that the appeal
proceedings were ready for oral hearing following the two statements submitted by the parties and
that the RoP do not provide for a reply and a rejoinder. The judge-rapporteur nevertheless gave the
parties an opportunity to submit new evidence within a period of five days from the date of
notification of the order and Suinno responded that it would not submit additional evidence.
50. Even if the facts alleged in the statement of 29 November 2024 were taken into consideration, this
would not alter the assessment of the case as it remains confirmed that is still
registered as Suinno’s managing director and that he owns a significant number of shares of the
company, at least indirectly and, thus, still holds extensive administrative and financial powers
within Suinno. The fact, alleged by Suinno in said additional statement and in the oral hearing, that
according to a recent Income and Balance Sheet its turnover is only and Suinno’s conclusion
that is not dependent on Suinno, does not alter this assessment.
51. Finally, the additional observations filed by Suinno after the hearing under a R. 9.3 RoP application
cannot be considered, for the same reasons as those mentioned under paragraph 49 above
concerning the statement filed by Suinno on 29 November 2024.
52. The Order of the Court of First Instance to declare Suinno’s R. 262A application inadmissible is
therefore correct.
Alternative requests
53. The alternative request made by Suinno to “move” the filing date of the main infringement action
to 17 September 2024 was raised for the first time on appeal and shall be rejected as inadmissible
under Rule 222.2 as Suinno did not provide any reason why this request was not submitted during
the proceedings before the Court of First Instance.
54. The alternative request made by it for a reimbursement of court fees shall be rejected, as such a
possibility is neither provided for in the UPCA nor in the Rules of Procedure.
Costs
55. Considering that proceedings are still pending before the Court of First Instance, the costs of the
proceedings, including those of this appeal, shall be determined by the Court of First Instance (see
Court of Appeal Order of 03 April 2024 in Juul/Njoy, APL_588420/2023, UPC_CoA_433/2023, and
Order of 24 September 2024 in Oppo/Panasonic, APL_32345/2024, UPC/CoA_ 298/2024).
Other grounds
56. Given the assessment in relation to the inadmissibility of the application, there is no need to
examine the other grounds brought forward by the parties. As the subject-matter of this appeal is
limited to admissibility of Suinno's application of 9 April 2024 pursuant to R. 262A RoP, it is not for
the Court of Appeal to decide as to whether can represent Suinno in the infringement
case pending before the Court of First Instance. This, however, will have to be decided by the Court
of First Instance. When deciding, the Court of First Instance may consider the order of the Court of
Appeal of 8 February 2024, UPC_CoA_404/2023, App_584498/2023, para 10 et seq., -
Ocado/Autostore."

ORDER
The appeal is rejected.
This order was issued on 11 February 2025